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Abstract—In this paper, we propose to utilize intelligent reflect-
ing surfaces (IRSs) for enhancing the physical layer security of
wireless communications systems. In particular, an IRS-assisted
secure wireless system is considered, where a multi-antenna
transmitter communicates with a single-antenna receiver in the
presence of an eavesdropper. To maximize the secrecy rate, both
the beamformer at the transmitter and the IRS phase shifts
are jointly optimized. Based on the block coordinate descent
(BCD) and minorization maximization (MM) techniques, two
efficient algorithms are developed to solve the resulting non-
convex optimization problem for small- and large-scale IRSs,
respectively. Simulation results show that IRSs can significantly
improve physical layer security if the proposed algorithms are
employed. Furthermore, we reveal that deploying large-scale
IRSs is more efficient than enlarging the antenna array size of
the transmitter for both boosting the secrecy rate and enhancing
the energy efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security has received considerable attention
from both academia and industry in recent years [1]. Various
approaches to improve physical layer security have been
proposed in the literature, e.g., cooperative relaying schemes,
artificial noise-aided beamforming [2], and cooperative jam-
ming [3]. However, deploying a large number of relays or
other helpers in secure wireless systems inevitably incurs
an excessive cost. Furthermore, cooperative jamming and
transmitting artificial noise consume additional power for secu-
rity provisioning. These shortcomings of existing approaches
urgently call for a new paradigm for secure wireless systems,
which is both cost-effective and energy-efficient.
With the rapid development of radio frequency (RF) micro-
electro-mechanical systems (MEMS), programmable and re-
configurable meta-surfaces have recently found abundant ap-
plications in the public and civil domains, among which
intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRSs) have drawn special at-
tention for their applications in wireless communications [4].
The artificial thin films of IRSs can be easily coated on
existing infrastructures such as walls of buildings, which re-
duces implementation cost and complexity. In addition, unlike
conventional communication transceivers, IRSs consume no
power as they are passive devices. Furthermore, different
from conventional transceivers, IRSs help transmit informa-
tion without generating new signals. Instead, they smartly
transform or recycle existing signals. To sum up, IRSs are
passive cost-effective devices with the ability to control the
radio propagation environment [5]. These characteristics make
IRSs promising key enablers for improving the physical layer
security of wireless communications in an economical and
energy-efficient manner.
There are several studies on the design of IRS-assisted wire-
less systems [6]–[10]. A point-to-point multiple-input single-
output (MISO) system was investigated in [7], [8], where
the IRS is implemented with continuous and discrete phase
shifters, respectively. Based on the semidefinite relaxation
(SDR) method, approximate solutions for the beamformer
at the access point and the phase shifts at the IRS were
developed. The authors of [9] considered a downlink multiuser
communication system, where the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) was maximized for given phase shifts.
Energy efficiency maximization was tackled in [10], where
sub-optimum zero-forcing beamforming was assumed at the
access point. We note that none of these existing works
considers physical layer security, despite its great importance
for modern wireless systems.
To fill this gap, this paper investigates physical layer security
provisioning for IRS-assisted wireless systems. Assume a
transmitter equipped with multiple antennas communicates
with one legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per. Both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are
assumed to use a single antenna, and the IRS is implemented
via programmable phase shifters. Our goal is to maximize the
secrecy rate of the considered system by optimizing both the
beamformer at the transmitter and the phase shifts at the IRS,
which leads to a non-convex optimization problem. Based
on the block coordinate descent (BCD) and minorization
maximization (MM) techniques, two efficient algorithms are
proposed for solving the problem. The first algorithm is more
suitable for small-scale IRSs, while the second algorithm is
advantageous for large-scale IRSs. Unlike existing works [7],
[9], [10], we obtain locally optimal solutions for both the
beamformer and the phase shifts. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, this is the first work that studies the design of
secure IRS-assisted wireless systems.
Notations: The imaginary unit of a complex number is
denoted by  =
√−1. Matrices and vectors are denoted by
boldface capital and lower-case letters, respectively. Cm×n
denotes the set of all m× n complex-valued matrices. Im is
the m-dimensional identity matrix. The i-th element of vector
a is denoted as ai. A
∗ and AH stand for the conjugate and
conjugate transpose of matrix A. diag(a1, · · · , an) denotes a
diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are a1, · · · , an. The
largest eigenvalue of matrix A and the corresponding eigen-
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Fig. 1. An IRS-assisted secure communication system.
vector are denoted by λmax(A) and λmax(A), respectively.
, means “defined as”. Expectation and the real part of a
complex number are denoted by E[·] and ℜ(·), respectively.
The operation ∠(A) constructs a matrix by extracting the
phases of the elements of matrix A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider an IRS-assisted communication system, which
consists of a transmitter, one legitimate receiver, an eaves-
dropper, and an IRS, as shown in Fig. 1. We assume that the
transmitter is equipped with Nt antennas, while the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper use a single receive antenna,
respectively. The passive IRS is deployed in the network to
improve the physical layer security, and employs M phase
shifters. Equipped with a controller, the phase shifts of the IRS
are programmable. Furthermore, we assume a quasi-static flat-
fading channel model and perfect channel state information
(CSI) knowledge at both the transmitter and the IRS1. The
received baseband signals at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper can be expressed as
yl = h
H
l ΦGfx+ nl,
ye = h
H
e ΦGfx+ ne,
(1)
where hl ∈ CM×1 and he ∈ CM×1 represent the channels
from the IRS to the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper,
respectively. The phase shift matrix Φ of the IRS is given by
Φ = diag(eθ1 , eθ2, · · · , eθM ), where θk is the phase shift of
the k-th reflecting element of the IRS [7]. The channel matrix
from the transmitter to the IRS is denoted as G ∈ CM×Nt ,
and the linear beamforming vector at the transmitter side is
denoted as f ∈ CNt×1. The signal transmitted to the legitimate
receiver is denoted as x, where E[|x|2] = 1 without loss of
generality. nl and ne are additive complex Gaussian noises
with variances σ2l and σ
2
e , respectively.
1While the CSI of the eavesdropper is generally difficult to acquire, the
results in this paper serve as theoretical performance upper bounds for the
considered system. These bounds and the insights gained from them can be
used to guide the system design for the case when the CSI of the eavesdropper
is not perfectly known.
The achievable secrecy rate of the IRS-assisted MISO
wireless system is given by [11][
log
(
1 +
1
σ2l
∣∣hHl ΦGf ∣∣2
)
− log
(
1 +
1
σ2e
∣∣hHe ΦGf ∣∣2
)]+
,
(2)
where [x]+ = max{0, x}. Our goal in this paper is to maxi-
mize the secrecy rate by optimizing the transmit beamforming
vector f and the phase shift matrix Φ of the IRS. We note
that dropping the operator [·]+ in (2) has no impact on the
optimization2. The resulting optimization is formulated as
P1 :
maximize
f ,Φ
1 + 1
σ2
l
∣∣hHl ΦGf ∣∣2
1 + 1
σ2
e
|hHe ΦGf |2
subject to ‖f‖2 ≤ P
Φ = diag
(
eθ1 , eθ2, · · · , eθM ) ,
(3)
where P ≥ 0 is the given total transmit power.
Remark 1: Note that, different from secure wireless systems
without IRSs, in the second constraint of optimization problem
P1, each diagonal element in the phase shift matrix Φ has
unit modulus, i.e., |eθk | = 1. This non-convex constraint
together with the non-convex objective function makes P1 a
non-convex problem. The globally optimal solution of non-
convex optimization problems with unit modulus constraints
is in general not tractable [12].
III. DESIGN OF SECURE IRS-ASSISTED WIRELESS
SYSTEMS
Block coordinate descent (BCD) methods optimize the
objective function with respect to different subsets (blocks) of
optimization variables in each iteration while the other blocks
are fixed. BCD has been shown to be a widely applicable
and empirically successful approach in many applications [12],
[13], and typically leads to a sub-optimal solution for non-
convex problems. In this paper, we resort to this approach as
the main methodology for solving P1 efficiently.
A. Transmit Beamformer Design
According to the principle of BCD, we first investigate the
optimization of beamforming vector f for a fixed phase shift
matrix Φ. The beamformer design problem is accordingly
given by
P2 : maximize
||f ||2≤P
1 + 1
σ2
l
∣∣hHl ΦGf ∣∣2
1 + 1
σ2
e
|hHe ΦGf |2
, (4)
and the optimal solution is provided in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given the phase shift matrix Φ of the IRS, the
optimal solution for beamforming vector f is given by
f⋆ =
√
Pλmax
(
X−1e Xl
)
, (5)
2 The secrecy rate is zero if the transmission is turned off. Hence, the
term log
(
1 + 1
σ2
l
∣∣hH
l
ΦGf
∣∣2)
− log
(
1 + 1
σ2
e
∣∣hHe ΦGf ∣∣2
)
will always
be non-negative if the beamformer and the phase shifts are optimized to
maximize the secrecy rate.
θ˜k = arctan
ce,kdl,k cos (pl,k)− cl,kde,k cos (pe,k)
ce,kdl,k sin (pl,k)− cl,kde,k sin (pe,k) − arccos
dl,kde,k sin (pe,k − pl,k)√
c2e,kd
2
l,k + c
2
l,kd
2
e,k − 2cl,kce,kdl,kde,k cos (pl,k − pe,k)
(12)
where
Xi = INt +
P
σ2i
GHΦHhih
H
i ΦG, i ∈ {l, e}. (6)
Proof: It was shown in [14] that allocating all transmit
power for beamforming is optimal, i.e., ‖f⋆‖2 = P . Then, the
numerator and denominator of the objective function of P2
can be rewritten as
1 +
P
σ2i
∣∣∣hHi ΦGf˜ ∣∣∣2 = f˜H f˜ + Pσ2i f˜H
(
GHΦHhih
H
i ΦG
)
f˜
, f˜HXi f˜ , (7)
where f˜ = f/
√
P is a unit vector. By substituting (7) into the
objection function of P2, we can rewrite P2 as
maximize
||f˜||2=1
f˜HXlf˜
f˜HXe f˜
. (8)
In this way, we transform P2 to a generalized eigenvalue
problem, whose optimal solution is given by (5).
Remark 2: The result in Lemma 1 is similar to secure beam-
forming design for MISO communications without IRSs, for
which a closed-form solution is available [14]. In particular,
the beamformer f is designed to be as orthogonal to the effec-
tive eavesdropping channel hHe ΦG as possible, while being as
aligned with the effective legitimate receiver channel hHl ΦG
as possible. Compared to conventional secure communications
systems, the incorporation of the IRS adds another degree
of freedom (DoF) to establish favorable effective channels
hHl ΦG and h
H
e ΦG by carefully choosing the phase shift
matrix Φ.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no general
approach for the optimal design of the phase shift matrix
Φ. Hence, in the following two subsections, we propose two
different approaches for optimizing Φ in the BCD procedure.
B. Element-Wise BCD
In this subsection, we adopt an element-wise BCD for
optimizing the phase shift matrix Φ. In other words, we
take each phase shift θk as one block in the BCD. The
corresponding optimization problem is given by
P3 :
maximize
θk
1 + 1
σ2
l
∣∣hHl ΦGf ∣∣2
1 + 1
σ2
e
|hHe ΦGf |2
subject to Φ = diag
(
eθ1, · · · , eθk , · · · , eθM ) .
(9)
The optimal solution is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given the beamforming vector f and phase shifts
{θm}m 6=k, the optimal solution for θk is given by
θ⋆k =
{
θ˜k + π ce,kdl,k cos (pl,k) < cl,kde,k cos (pe,k)
θ˜k otherwise,
(10)
Algorithm 1 Element-Wise BCD
1: Construct an initial Φ(0) and set t = 0;
2: repeat
3: Fix Φ(t) and optimize f (t) according to (5);
4: for k = 1 to M do
5: Optimize the phase shift θ
(t+1)
k according to (10);
6: end for
7: t← t+ 1;
8: until convergence;
where
ci,k =
1
2

1 + 1
σ2i
∣∣h∗i,kgHk f ∣∣2 + 1σ2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m 6=k
h∗i,me
θmgHmf
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

 ,
di,k =
1
σ2i
∣∣∣∣∣∣h∗i,kgHk f
∑
m 6=k
hi,me
−θmfHgm
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (11)
pi,k = ∠

h∗i,kgHk f ∑
m 6=k
hi,me
−θmfHgm

 , i ∈ {l, e},
gHk is the k-th row of matrix G, and θ˜k is given by (12) shown
on top of this page.
Proof: See Appendix A.
With Lemmas 1 and 2 at hand, the element-wise BCD
is summarized in Algorithm 1. As the closed-form globally
optimal solutions in (5) and (10) are used in each block of
the element-wise BCD, the objective function monotonically
increases. In addition, it is easy to verify that the objec-
tive function is upper bounded by the point-to-point MISO
channel capacity. These two properties together guarantee that
Algorithm 1 converges to a locally optimal solution of P1.
However, the number of BCD blocks is M + 1 since each
phase shift is a block. This leads to a slow convergence for
large IRS sizes M .
C. Alternating Optimization With MM
Instead of treating each phase θk as a single block in the
BCD, in this subsection, we take the entire phase shift matrix
Φ as one block. Consequently, there are only two blocks in
the BCD. Hence, the BCD reduces to the special case of
alternating optimization (AO). By leveraging the minorization
maximization (MM) technique, we update all phase shifts
{θk}Mk=1 in parallel in each iteration.
We reformulate the optimization of the phase shift matrix
Φ as follows. Using
hHi ΦG = v
HRi, i ∈ {l, e}, (13)
where v = [eθ1, . . . , eθM ]H and Ri = diag(h
H
i )G, the
numerator and denominator in (9) can be rewritten as
1 +
1
σ2i
∣∣hHi ΦGf ∣∣2 (a)= 1M vHv + 1σ2i vHRiffHRHi v
, vHYiv,
(14)
where Yi =
1
M
IM +
P
σ2
i
Riff
HRHi , and step (a) exploits
vHv = M . Therefore, optimization problem P3 can be recast
as
P4 : maximizev g(v) =
vHYlv
vHYev
subject to |vk| = 1, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}.
(15)
Remark 3: The main difficulty in solving P4 is the unit
modulus constraint, which is element-wise and highly non-
convex. By introducingV = vvH as the optimization variable
and relaxing the rank-one constraint of V, P4 can be solved
via semidefinite relaxation (SDR). The resulting problem is a
quasi-convex problem, whose optimal solution can be obtained
by solving a series of semidefinite programming (SDP) prob-
lems. However, there is no guarantee that the obtained solution
V is a rank-one matrix, and therefore the SDR approach
can only provide an approximate solution for v. As a result,
the objective function does not necessarily increase in each
iteration of the AO, and the convergence of the SDR-based
algorithm cannot be guaranteed. In addition, the computational
complexity of solving a large number of SDP problems in each
iteration of the AO is prohibitively high.
In this paper, we propose to solve P4 by the MM technique
[15], whose main idea is illustrated in Fig. 2. In particular,
assuming the value of v in the t-th iteration of the AO is
denoted as v
(t)
z , we construct a lower bound on the objective
function g(v) that touches the objective function at point
v
(t)
z , denoted as f
(
v|v(t)z
)
. We adopt this lower bound as
a surrogate objective function, and the maximizer of this
surrogate objective function is then taken as the value of v
in the next iteration of the AO, i.e., v
(t+1)
z . In this way, the
objective value is monotonically increasing from one iteration
to the next, i.e., g
(
v
(t+1)
z
)
≥ g
(
v
(t)
z
)
. The key to the success
of MM lies in constructing a surrogate objective function
f
(
v|v(t)z
)
for which the maximizer v
(t+1)
z is easy to find.
For phase shift matrix optimization problem P4, a surrogate
objective function is composed in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The objective function g(v) is lower bounded by
g(v) =
vHYlv
vHYev
≥ f (v|vz) + [g(vz)− f(vz|vz)] , (16)
where
f (v|vz) = 2
ℜ (vHz Ylv)
vHz Yevz
− v
H
z Ylvz
(vHz Yevz)
2
{
vHλmax(Ye)v
+2ℜ (vHz [Ye − λmax(Ye)IM ]v) }, (17)
and g(vz)− f(vz|vz) is a constant term that is irrelevant for
optimization.
v
(t+1)
z
v
(t)
z
f
(
v|v(t)
z
)
f
(
v|v(t+1)
z
)
g (v)
g
(
v
(t+1)
z
)
≥ g
(
v
(t)
z
)
Fig. 2. The procedure of minorization maximization.
Proof: Defining y = vHYev, the objective function
g(v) , v
H
Ylv
y
is jointly convex in {v, y} since Yl =
1
M
IM +
P
σ2
l
Rlff
HRHl is positive definite. Because of the
convexity, we have the following inequality
vHYlv
vHYev
≥ 2ℜ
(
vHz Ylv
)
vHz Yevz
− v
H
z Ylvz
(vHz Yevz)
2v
HYev + c
(b)
≥ f (v|vz) + [g(vz)− f(vz |vz)] ,
(18)
where c is a constant and (b) applies [16, Lemma 1].
Proposition 1. The phase shift optimization problem in each
iteration of the AO is equivalent to
P5 : v(t+1)z = arg max
|vi|=1
ℜ
[(
w(t)
)H
v
]
, (19)
where
w(t) =
Ylv
(t)
z(
v
(t)
z
)H
Yev
(t)
z
−
(
v
(t)
z
)H
Ylv
(t)
z[(
v
(t)
z
)H
Yev
(t)
z
]2
× [Ye − λmax(Ye)IM ]v(t)z .
(20)
The optimal solution of P5 is given by3
∠
(
v(t+1)z
)
= ∠
(
w(t)
)
. (21)
Proof: With Lemma 3, the optimization problem that
needs to be solved is the maximization of f (v|vz) in (17)
with respect to v. Since vHv is a constant, the proposition
can be proved with basic algebraic manipulations.
The AO-MM algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2. With
the closed-form solutions in (5) and (21), the objective func-
tion is guaranteed to monotonically increase and to converge
to a local optimum. There are some open issues that require
further remarks.
(1) Initial point: In both the element-wise BCD and AO-
MM algorithms, we require an initialization for the phase
shifts of the IRS. As P1 is a non-convex problem, the quality
of the sub-optimal solution depends to some extent on the
3Since vz is a unit modulus vector, it is sufficient to determine the phases
of the elements of the vector.
Algorithm 2 Alternating Optimization With Minorization
Maximization (AO-MM)
1: Construct an initial v
(0)
z and set t = 0;
2: repeat
3: Fix v
(t)
z and optimize f
(t) according to (5);
4: Optimize v
(t+1)
z according to (20) and (21);
5: t← t+ 1;
6: until convergence.
initialization. Here, we propose an effective way to construct
the initial values of the phase shifts. In particular, we set
∠
(
v(0)z
)
= ∠ (u) , Φ(0) = diag
(
v(0)z
)
, (22)
where u is the dominant left singular vector of Rl in (13).
This initialization is a heuristic obtained by ignoring the
denominator of the objective function.
(2) Complexity comparison: As closed-form solutions are
obtained for all the blocks of both algorithms, the compu-
tational complexity of the proposed algorithms is critically
determined by the total number of block updates until conver-
gence. In particular, the number of blocks in each iteration of
the element-wise BCD algorithm is M+12 times higher than
that of the AO-MM algorithm. On the other hand, as globally
optimal solutions (11) are obtained for all the blocks of the
element-wise BCD algorithm, the number of iterations needed
for convergence is less than for the AO-MM algorithm, in
which the phase shifts are updated in parallel but sub-optimally
by (21). Therefore, there is a trade-off between the number of
blocks per iteration and the number of iterations required for
convergence, which shall be investigated in the next section.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance
of the proposed algorithms. The channels are assumed to be
independent Rayleigh fading, and the path loss exponent is
denoted by α with reference distance 10 meters. The noise
power at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
is set to σ2l = σ
2
e = −80 dBm. The distance between the
transmitter and the IRS is denoted as rTR, while rRl and rRe
are the distances from the IRS to the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, respectively. The simulation results in Figs.
4 and 5 are averaged over 1000 channel realizations.
A. Comparison of the Proposed Algorithms
The convergence of the proposed algorithms is investigated
for three typical examples in Fig. 3. The stopping criterion for
convergence is that the increment of the normalized objective
function is less than ǫ = 10−6. We first investigate the scenario
where the thin film employed to implement the IRS has a
small area, e.g., M = 5. Although the number of blocks
per iteration of the element-wise BCD algorithm is slightly
larger for the AO-MM algorithm (6 versus 2), the element-wise
BCD algorithm needs much fewer iterations for convergence
since globally optimal solutions are obtained for all the blocks.
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the proposed algorithms for different values of M
when Nt = 5, α = 4, P = 5 dBm, rTR = 250 m, rRl = rRe = 160 m.
Therefore, the element-wise BCD algorithm converges faster
when M is relatively small. On the other hand, as the value of
M gradually increases, i.e.,M = 40, a large number of blocks
(41 blocks) have to be updated in each iteration of the element-
wise BCD algorithm, which slows down the convergence. In
contrast, only two blocks per iteration have to be updated in
the AO-MM algorithm. This offsets the drawback that the AO-
MM requires more iterations due to the sub-optimal solutions
for each phase shift update block. In summary, the element-
wise BCD algorithm is suitable for small-scale IRS systems
while the AO-MM algorithm is preferable for large-scale IRS
systems.
B. Average Secrecy Rate Evaluation
In Fig. 4, the average achievable secrecy rate is plotted for
different algorithms. First, we observe that the average secrecy
rate achieved by both proposed algorithms is the same. We also
compare our approach with a benchmark system which does
not employ an IRS for security provisioning. In this case, the
distance between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver
is denoted by rTl while the distance between the transmitter
and the eavesdropper is denoted by rTe
4. To maximize the
secrecy rate, optimal transmit beamforming according to (5)
is adopted. As can be observed from Fig. 4, the system
with IRS provides a significant performance gain in terms
of the secrecy rate, which indicates that deploying IRSs is a
promising approach for improving the physical layer security
of wireless communications systems.
C. Massive MIMO or Massive IRS?
For conventional wireless communications systems, de-
ploying large-scale antenna arrays at the transceivers is an
effective way to boost communication performance, including
the network capacity and physical layer security. Therefore,
4 The values of rTl and rTe and the performance gains achievable with
IRSs depend on the geometry of the network. In Fig. 4, we investigate different
geometries by providing one example with rTl < rRl and rTe < rRe, and
one example with rTl > rRl and rTe > rRe.
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Fig. 4. Average secrecy rate achieved by different algorithms when M = 10
and Nt = 8.
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Fig. 5. Average secrecy rate achieved for different values of M and Nt ,
when P = 5 dBm, α = 4, rTR = 200 m, rRl = 150 m, rRe = 100 m,
rTl = 300 m, and rTe = 110 m.
it is intriguing to investigate how much performance gain we
can obtain from large-scale IRSs. In Fig. 5, we first increase
the number of reflecting elements of the IRS while keeping
the number of antenna elements as Nt = 10 (red curve).
In addition, to illustrate the effectiveness of the IRS, we
also evaluate the average secrecy rate achieved for different
numbers of transmit antenna elements when using an IRS
with M = 10 (blue curve). As can be observed from Fig.
5, increasing the number of IRS reflecting elements is more
beneficial for improving the secrecy rate than increasing the
number of antenna elements. Moreover, as the IRS is a passive
device, deploying large-scale IRSs is more energy-efficient
than installing more energy-consuming RF chains and power
amplifiers as is needed for increasing the number of antenna
elements at the transmitter. These results clearly demonstrate
the superiority of IRSs compared with conventional system
designs in terms of both communication performance and
energy consumption.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed to improve the physical layer
security of wireless communications networks by deploying
IRSs. Two efficient algorithms, i.e., the element-wise BCD
and AO-MM algorithms, were developed for joint optimization
of the beamformer at the transmitter and the phase shifts
at the IRS. The element-wise BCD algorithm was shown to
be preferable for small-scale IRS-assisted systems, while the
AO-MM algorithm is advantageous for wireless systems with
large-scale IRSs. Simulation results have confirmed the huge
potential of IRSs to improve the security and energy efficiency
of future communications systems.
APPENDIX
As the phase shift matrix Φ is a diagonal matrix, the
objective function of P3 can be rewritten as a function of
the k-th reflecting element as follows:
1 + 1
σ2
l
∣∣hHl ΦGf ∣∣2
1 + 1
σ2
e
|hHe ΦGf |2
=
cl,k + dl,k cos(θk + pl,k)
ce,k + de,k cos(θk + pe,k)
, (23)
where ci,k, di,k, and pi,k are given in (11). By taking the
derivative of the objective function with respect to θk, and
setting the derivative to zero, we obtain the following equation
dl,k sin(θk + pl,k) [ce,k + de,k cos(θk + pe,k)]
= de,k sin(θk + pe,k) [cl,k + dl,k cos(θk + pl,k)] .
(24)
This equation can be further simplified by some basic trigono-
metric manipulations as follows,
Ak sin θk +Bk cos θk = dl,kde,k sin(pe,k − pl,k), (25)
where
Ak , ce,kdl,k cos pl,k − cl,kde,k cos pe,k,
Bk , ce,kdl,k sin pl,k − cl,kde,k sin pe,k.
(26)
When Ak ≥ 0, by introducing an auxiliary angle, the equation
can be recast as
cos
(
θk − arctan Ak
Bk
)
=
dl,kde,k sin(pe,k − pl,k)√
A2 +B2
. (27)
It can be readily shown by checking the second derivative that
the objective function is maximized when
θk = arctan
Ak
Bk
− arccos dl,kde,k sin(pe,k − pl,k)√
A2 +B2
. (28)
The optimal solution whenAk < 0 can be obtained in a similar
manner, which completes the proof.
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